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Executive Summary
Medicare expenditures per capita vary widely across different parts of the
country Average fee-for-service per capita expenditures in 1995/96 were
$3,420 in Eugene, Oregon, $3,663 in Minneapolis, $7,847 in Miami, and $8,861
in McAllen, Texas. These measures are adjusted for differences across regions
in the age, sex, and racial composition of the population, as well as differences
in the underlying cost of health care. In this paper, we focus on these geograph-
ical variations in the Medicare program and argue that they are central to any
proposed reform of the Medicare system. The first question that must be ad-
dressed is, are these expenditures higher in high-cost areas because the elderly
population there is sicker? The answer is, largely no. Many of the areas with
the highest levels of spending have similar underlying disease burdens to re-
gions with low levels of spending. Nor does quality of care or patient satisfac-
tion appear to be better in the high-expenditure areas. These disparities bring
up a number of issues related to equity across regions, efficiency of Medicare
spending, and the potential for funding Medicare reform. Reducing the inten-
sity of care in high-expenditure regions can fund prescription drug benefits for
the entire Medicare population, or extend the solvency of the Medicare trust
funds by ten years, without obvious adverse implications for the health or sat-
isfaction of the elderly population.
A somewhat surprising characteristic of the Medicare system is the ex-
tent to which per-capita Medicare payments vary across regions. Aver-
age 1995-96 fee-for-service Medicare per-capita expenditures were
$3,420 in Eugene, Oregon; $3,663 in Minneapolis; $7,847 in Miami; and
$8,861 in McAllen, Texas. These amounts are all adjusted for age, sex,
race, and regional price differences.1 The existence of these variations is
well-understood in the health policy community in Washington, D.C.,
and is particularly well understood by managed care companies whose
Medicare capitated payments are indexed to these regional costs. Why
these variations exist at all is less well understood.70 Skinner and Wennberg
Recent proposals for Medicare reform have struggled with geo-
graphicaldifferencesin Medicare spending.For example, the
Breaux-Thomas plan developed under the auspices of the National Bi-
partisan Commission on the Future of Medicare proposed a premium
support program to replace the current Medicare system.2 Under pre-
mium supports, elderly Medicare enrollees would choose from a menu
of private health insurance carriers and a government fee-for-service
plan, with the premium costs being paid for in part (or entirely) by
Medicare. In the proposal's summary, there was no mention at all of
how the premiums would be adjusted for regional circumstances.
Would they be benchmarked to national levels, or would the premiums
be high in Miami and low in Minneapolis? It was clear that the Biparti-
san Commission understood the issue. In a supportingdocument, the
issues were set forth quite clearly:
Whether the government contribution is linked to average Medicare plan
premiums in the county metropolitan area, the nation, or some other area de-
pends on whether the government wishes to reflect the variation that exists
across regions of the country. The contribution might be adjustedfor geo-
graphic differences such as local labor rates and local prices for goods and ser-
vices, but not adjusted for variations such as differences in provider practice
patterns or other unexplained utilization differences.3
In this article, we focus on these geographical variations in the
Medicare program and argue that they should be central to any pro-
posed reform. We suggest that Medicare expenditureswhether for
premium support programs, the current fee-for-service system, or
Medicare managed careshould be adjusted for geographic differ-
ences such as local labor rates, local prices for goods and services,and
even the general health of the community. After adjusting for thesefac-
tors, however, an enormous amount of variation, the so-called unex-
plained residual, has been difficult to account for. Is it simply reflecting
unmet health needs, or preferences, or physical practice patterns? And
does the extra "residual" spending actually lead to better quality of
care?
We consider these questions below. First, we argue that a modest de-
gree of regional variation in Medicare spending is caused by healthdif-
ferences. Elderly citizens of Huntington, West Virginia, are indeed
sicker on average than those in Grand Junction, Colorado, and for this
reason Medicare spending should be higher in Huntington.However,
health differences explain only a small fraction of the total variation in
Medicare expenditures across regions in the United States; a largerRegional Inequality in Medicare Spending 71
fraction of the unexplained residual appears to be related to patterns of
general medical care by providers.4 These patterns of intensityare
reflected best in how Medicare patients are treated in the last six
months of life. By focusing on Medicare enrollees near death, wecan
effectively control for differences across regions in underlying health
needs. Indeed, it turns out that indicators of the intensity ofcare in the
last six monthssuch as the average number of physician specialist
visitsare largely uncorrelated with indicators of community health
levels but are highly correlated with Medicare spending. In short,we
find that treatment patterns in the last six months of life are good in-
struments for general medical practice patterns in the region.
The next important question is whether the government should ac-
commodate regional spending disparities by tying future payments to
current (different) average per-capita spending levels. We argue that,
along a number of dimensions, practice patterns in low-costareas com-
pared to high-cost areas yield similar quality in terms of both patient
survival and quality of care; indeed there is some evidence that patient
satisfaction may be higher in low-intensity areas. These regional dis-
parities also bring up issues of equity: to the extent that elderly people
in Minnesota and in Miami have paid similar amounts of taxes into the
Medicare system, why should the elderly in Miami getso much more
in revenue?5
Finally, we suggest that these regional variations in Medicare spend-
ing should be considered part of any Medicare reform simply because
the fiscal implications of reducing regional inequalities can save bil-
lions of dollars in Medicare expenditures. A simple program thatre-
duces the intensity of health care to levels consistent with 20 percent of
regions in the United States would extend the solvency of the Part A
trust fund an extra 10 years, to 2025.6
I.The Nature of the Problem
In this section, we consider first the extent of variations in Medicare
spending. We rely on data in the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care
(Wennberg and Cooper, 1997, 1999) for much of our data discussion.
The atlas developed geographic cachement areas that reflected actual
migration patterns of the Medicare population. Each hospital referral
region (HRR) was defined as an area with at least one major hospital
that performed cardiovascular procedures. Nearly every zip code in
the United States was then assigned to an HRR dependingon the72 Skinner and Wennberg
discharge patterns of the Medicare patients. Attempts were made in
the final assignment to preserve contiguous borders for the HRR, but in
a few cases, migration patterns were sufficiently strong to cause an
HRR to be split.7 All calculations of rates presented below were as-
signed by location of residence and not where the service was actually
performed. For example, if an individual from Arlington, Virginia,
went to the University of Virginia hospital in Charlottesville, the
Medicare charges would be attributed to the Arlington HRR, not the
Charlottesville HRR. Thus, the atlas definition of rates by zip code of
residence avoids the kinds of selection bias problems that occur when a
particular area (like Boston) attracts large numbers of patients from
distant areas. To control further for regional differences not related to
health care, we price-adjust Medicare spending to remove the fact that
New York City hospitals and physicians are paid more per procedure
than those in Enid, Oklahoma.8
Figure 3.1 shows a map of the 306 HRRs in the United States, with
the accompanying quintile of HRR-level Medicare spending, adjusted
for regional differences in age, sex, and race.9 There is considerable
variation in per-capita Medicare spending across state: sixty-two re-
gions in the United States spend less than $4,178 per person, while
sixty-one regions spend more than $5,698, ranging up to nearly $8,000
in regions like Miami and Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
What is it about the high-cost areas that makes them high-cost? This
question has been the topic of debate for many years. Some view these
higher costs as arising from differences in preferences or in underlying
health needs.1° Any correlation between health care resources, such as
hospital beds or physician supply, and overall utilization rates is the
consequence of "demand-induced demand," or health care resources
moving to areas with the greatest demand.
Others, like those in the "supplier-induced demand" literature, have
viewed the reason for these differences as related to physician behav-
ior: some areas just have more doctors, and those doctors maximize
utility by doing more procedures and thus generating a larger revenue
(Labelle, Stoddart, and Rice 1994; Auster and Oaxaca 1981; see also
Wennberg and Gittelsohn 1982). More recently the "supplier-induced
demand" model has been augmented by the idea that some physicians
show greater "enthusiasm" for surgical procedures (Chassin 1993). We
want to draw a distinction here between "enthusiasm" for specific sur-
gical procedures and the general intensity of medical care. Surgical en-
thusiasm may not be closely correlated with overall levels of Medicare








Price-adjusted reimbursements for noncapitated Medicare expenditures per capita by
Hospital Referral Region (1996)
lower in Miami than in Minneapolis. Instead, we are interested in the
treatment of chronic disease such as congestive heart failure or chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) that accounts for a large fraction
of overall Medicare dollars, particularly in the last six months of life.
While we cannot sort out the various theories, it is clearly important
to distinguish between health-related reasons for variations in
Medicare spending and those related to provider behavior. If the varia-
tion in Medicare spending observed across regions is the consequence
of health-related demand, then such variation should be preserved, not
erased. In the next section, we consider demand-driven reasons for the
differences in health care costs across regions.
II.Health-Based Differences in Regional Medicare Spending
To characterize community-level health requirements or illness bur-
den, we consider five "low-variation" conditions that are not strongly74 Skinner and Wennberg
related to the supply of health care resources. Nearly every elderly per-
son with a hip fracture, for example, isadmitted to a hospital, and thus
the incidence rate of hip fracture hospitalizations is a nearly perfect
measure of the underlying population-levelincidence. Hip fracture
rates vary little across regions and are likely related to long-termnutri-
tional habits. The incidence of hospitalization for wrist or ankle frac-
tures, on the other hand, is not a good measure of theunderlying
health care demand because these fractures are highly variable across
regions and are likely related in part to practice patterns of physicians
(Wennberg and Cooper, 1999). Other indicators of underlying health
status are age-sex-raceadjusted rates of heart attacks (acute myocar-
dial infarction, or AMI), strokes, gastrointestinal bleeding, and colon
cancer. All these events generally lead to hospitalization, sohospital-
ization records provide a good measure of population-level incidence.
In addition, we also include the percentage of the elderly who are func-
tionally disabled as reported in the 1990 census.11 Means and standard
deviations are presented in column 1 of table 3.1.
Our strategy is first to show that these indicators of community-level
disease burdens are strong predictors of mortality. There is consider-
able variation in age-sex-raceadjusted mortality rates in the elderly
population, ranging from less than forty per thousand in Sun City, Ari-
zona, to more than sixty per thousand in Slidell,Louisiana, and Hun-
tington, West Virginia. In the second colunm of table 3.1, we measure
how much of this regional variation in mortality is associated with our
indicators of health.12 All regressions are weighted by the Medicare
population, and t-statistics are estimated using the Huber-White
heteroscedasticity-consistent approach. All illness levels show a strong
positive correlation with generally significant results; the overall R2 is
0.48, which means that nearly half of the variation in mortality rates are
explained by these health indicators. Note that the coefficients in this
regression should be interpreted not simply as the mortality rates from
those diseases but also as the extent to which the disease indicators are
correlated with other illness that, in turn, affect mortality.
Column 3 of table 3.1 shows how Medicare expenditures per capita
are associated with these indicators of communityhealth. Generally,
there is a positive association with illness rates and Medicare expendi-
tures; an increase in the rate of gastrointestinal bleeding of0.1 percent
(or one per thousand) is associated with an increase in Medicarespend-
ing of $209 per capita. This statement seems to imply that, in a group of

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































076 Skinner and Wennberg
in Medicare expenditures of $209,000 ($209 times 1,000people). The
magnitude of the effectmuch larger than the actual cost of GI bleed-
ingsuggests that regions with higher CI bleeding rates are alsolikely
to suffer from other diseases that tend to increasehealth care costs. On
the other hand, the coefficients must also be interpreted withcaution,
as suggested by the negativecoefficient on heart attacks (AMI). The rate
of AMI may be correlated with other factors affecting Medicarespend-
ing, so the negative coefficient is a reminder that we are notestimat-
ing a conventional risk adjustment measure.13 Still, despite thelow R2
of 0.30, we find evidence of illness-based differences inMedicare
spending.14
We created an illness adjustment factor by taking thepredicted level
of Medicare spending in column 3 of table 3.1 anddividing the pre-
dicted level by the average level in the United States. For example, our
illness adjustment is 1.20 in Birmington, Alabama, which means that
Medicare expenditures there are predicted to be 20 percent higher than
the U.S. average predicted simply on the basis of their higherlevels of
disease burden.'5 By contrast, Mesa, Arizona, would receive 15 percent
below average because of better than average health status.This ap-
proach does have its flaws because (as noted above) it may be adjusting
spending on the basis of nonhealth-related factors, but it does provide
a measure of the "upper bound" in termsof the explanatory power of
health-related indicators for overall Medicare spending.'6
Previous research has also followed this decompositionalapproach
to explaining Medicare benefits. In a recent articleCutler and Sheiner
(1999) explained a larger fraction of the regional variation inMedicare
spending by including demographic factors, such as the female per-
centage of the population and the percentage ofHispanic and Afri-
can-American members, as well as resource factors. Because their
measure of Medicare spending wasalready adjusted by sex and race
(atleast for African-Americans and nonAfrican-Americans)for
micro-level differences in spending, the causal paths by which these re-
gional demographic factors affect the demand (or supply) of Medicare
spending is not well understood.17
III.Practice Patterns in the Last Six Months of Life
We have adjusted for several important factors to explainoverall
Medicare per-capita expenditures, but there is still considerablevaria-Regional Inequality in Medicare Spending 77
tion in Medicare spending even after controlling for these factors. In
this section, we focus on one measure of medical health care intensity:
treatment patterns in the last six months of life. We argue that regions
with a higher number of physician visits in the last six months of life
tend to be those with more aggressive health care intensity as mea-
sured by substantially higher levels of per-capita expenditures in the
entire Medicare population. At best, however, they are correlated
weakly with underlying health status (Wennberg and Skinner, 1999).
Our index of mortality in column 2 of table 3.1, for example, explains
just 2 percent of the variation in end-of-life specialist visits. This figure
suggests to us that treatment patterns in the last six months of life
reflect provider-level attitudes toward the appropriate level of health
care intensity for chronically ill patients that are independent of the un-
derlying patterns of illness or poor health in the community.18
Figure 3.2 shows the variation in the number of visits by specialists
per individual in their last six months of life (age-sex-raceadjusted). In
Miami, for example, there were 25.1 visits per decedent, 22.9 in Los An-
geles, and 23.8 in Newark, New Jersey. By contrast, in the Minneapolis
HRR, there were just 3.8 visits per decedent; in Mason City, Iowa, there
were 2.0 visits, and in Lebanon, New Hampshire, there were 2.6 visits
(the average is 10). In part, some of the difference may be explained by
urban versus rural areas: the overall costs of seeing a specialist is prob-
ably lower in Miami than in Mason City. But the magnitude of the dif-
ferences is remarkable.
Maybe regions with high levels of physician visits substitute outpa-
tient care for inpatient care. However, regions with high levels of spe-
cialist visits in the last six months of life also tended to experience
above-average use of intensive care units. The percentage of people in
their last six months of life who were admitted to an ICU was 49 per-
cent in Miami but only 23 percent in Minneapolis; the correlation
coefficient between specialist visits and ICU admissions was 0.62.
We expand our previous regression of Medicare expenditures by
adding two more variables: the average number of primary care physi-
cian visits in the last six months of life, and the average number of spe-
cialist visits in the last six months. As shown in column 4 of table 3.1,
Medicare spending is highly correlated with specialist visits in the last
six months of life (with the R2 rising to 0.48). The coefficient for primary
care visits is positive but is not significant at conventional levels. Col-
umn 5 of table 3.1 includes the percentage of elderly people admitted78 Skinner and Wennberg
r-
N
R21.7 to 35.8 (60)
U18.lto2l.7 (63)
I 16.1 to 18.1 (65)
14.4 to 16.1 (58)
7.4 to 14.4 (60)
Not Popu1atd
Figure 3.2
Average number of physician visits per decedent in the last six months of life by Hospital
Referral Region (1996)
to an ICU in their last six months. Again, this indicator is highly predic-
tive for the pattern of Medicare spending in the entire population and
not just for those in their last six months.
When we focused on just specialistvisits, we used a more
nonparametric approach to estimating how specialist visits in the last
six months were related to overall Medicare spending. We first create
deciles of regions depending on their average number of specialist vis-
its in the last six months of life. For example, the bottom decile (decile
1) comprised HRRs with 10 percent of the elderly population. Among
these HRRs, the average number of specialist visits in the last six
ionths was 4.1. In the top 10 percent of the population (decile 10), the
average number of specialist visits was 20.6. We thenregressed
Medicare spending against the illness indicators and dummy variables
for each of the deciles, with the results shown graphically in figure
3319There is a strong and nearly monotonic relationship between spe-
'S
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Figure 3.3
Relationship between specialist visits in the last six months of life and Medicare
spending
cialist visits in the last six months and overall spending, with predicted
Medicare spending equal to $4,426 in the bottom decile and $5,823 in
the top decile. These estimates control for differences in health status
across regions.2°
We have suggested that these variations in overall per-capita
Medicare expenditures are the consequence of differences in practice
intensity. An alternative explanation is that preferences across regions
are different; in some areas, individuals prefer to receive more inten-
sive care, including more intensive care near death. According to this
alternative explanation, variations are "demand-induced" by patients
rather than "supply-induced" by health care providers.
A recent study sheds some light on this debate. The SUPPORT study
was a large, multi-center effort first to discern preferences about
end-of-life care among patients and then to implement advanced-care
directives to ensure that patient preferences were realized (SUPPORT
1995). Despite the best efforts of investigators to implement individual
patient preferences, the study had little success. For example, patients
who stated that they would prefer an out-of-hospital death "very
much" were more likely to die in a hospital than patients who did not
prefer an out-of-hospital death, holding health and demographic fac-
tors constant (although the differences were not significant). The only80 Skinner and Wennberg
factor that did predict whether individuals died in the hospital was the
overall supply of hospital resources in the region (Pritchard et al.
1998).21 That is, preferences of patients for what kind of death they pre-
ferred counted for nothing; what did matter was the propensity of
health care providers in that region to hospitalize their patients.
IV.But Do More Resources Lead to Better Quality Care?
Until this point, we have argued that much of the observed differences
in Medicare spending across regions is the consequence of variation in
practice patterns, particularly with respect to the treatment of chronic
disease. Of course, if the additional spending resulted in improved out-
comes or better quality care, one might hesitate to scale back high-cost
areas and suffer a loss in health outcomes as a consequence. Wedo not
address this quite complicated question directly but instead consider
the evidence from related studies both with respect to Medicare spend-
ing, survival rates, and the provision of preventive care with well-
established clinical benefit.
There is increasing evidence that, for many intensive forms of medi-
cal care, the benefits are small or even negative (e.g., McClellan,
McNeil, and Newhouse 1994; Conners et al. 1996). In related research,
we have argued that there does not appear to be anyrelationship be-
tween more intensive care and better survival patterns; this observa-
tion holds for overall mortality rates (Fisher et al. 2000; Wennberg and
Skinner 1999) as well as for mortality in a sample of hip fracture pa-
tients (Chau, Fisher, and Skinner 1999).
We can also gain estimates of the regional process of care by estimat-
ing the percentage of elderly patients receiving appropriate preventive
services, such as annual screening for mammography or immunization
for pneumonia. Our initial hypothesis is that higher levels of Medicare
spending should be reflected in better quality care because physicians
have more opportunity to provide preventive services with proven
clinical effectiveness (Wennberg and Cooper 1999). Figure 3.4 shows
the percentage of women in the Medicare population receiving mam-
mographies in 1996. Clearly, we should not expect 100 percent compli-
ance, but it is likely that mammography rates below 20 percent aretoo
low. There is no support for the initial hypothesis; if anything, there ap-
pears to be a negative correlation between per-capitaMedicare expen-
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Figure 3.4
Percentage of women receiving mammograms, by regional per-capita Medicare
expenditures
figure 3.5. Once again, there is a faintly negative correlation between
overall per-capita Medicare expenditures and the rate of immuniza-
tions for pneumococcal pneumonia. Similar patterns hold for other
forms of preventive screening, such as annual eye examinations for
diabetics.22
It is difficult to find evidence that regions with higher levels of
Medicare spending are associated with better health outcomes or a
higher quality of care. Another possibility is that the observed varia-
tions in Medicare spending were the consequences of patient prefer-
ences. While the results from the SUPPORT study suggest that
preferences do not determine regional differences in Medicare spend-
ing, we cannot rule out this explanation a priori. Even if preferences
were to determine a large fraction of the observed variation, on the ba-
sis of equity or fairness, we question whether the Medicare system
should be accommodating these preferences. Elderly people with simi-
lar ages and lifetime incomes have paid about the same amount into
the Medicare system through payroll tax contributions and general tax
revenue. Why should their benefits differ by a factor of 2 (Feenberg and
Skinner 1999)? A reduction in geographical disparities could im-
prove the overall fairness of the Medicare system in addition to having
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Figure 3.5
Percentage of elderly receiving immunization against pneumococcal pneumonia,by re-
gional per-capita Medicare expenditures
V.Budgetary Implications of Reducing Regional Differences in
Medicare Expenditures
In this section, we consider a specific reform that uses theillness adjust-
ment mechanism for benchmarking the appropriatelevel of Medicare
spending. First, we benchmark an "appropriate" level of Medicare
spending as being the level of age-sex-race- and illness-adjustment
per-capita expenditures observed in those regions where health carein-
tensityas measured by specialist visits in the last sixmonths of
lifeis relatively low. Obviously, we could benchmarkMedicare
spending to regions like Minneapolis with very low levelsof health
care intensity and low levelsof Medicare expenditures. Instead we
adopt a more conservative approach, which is to benchmark Medicare
spending to that level of Medicare spending experienced byone-fifth
of the U.S. elderly population in low intensity areas. Thisapproach im-
plies a 10 percent reduction in overall Medicare spending. Weadjust re-
gional Medicare spending by the illness adjustment measure calculated
above and set the level of Medicare spending to ensure a 10 percent cut
in the overall budget. (If regions are below thebenchmarked amount
anyway, we leave thematthatamount.) For example,the
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than actual expenditures ($5,514 versus $5,709) because spendingin
Birmingham was not very high to begin with and the illness adjust-
ment of 20 percent allowed for higher-than-expected levels of spending
to treat the sicker population. By contrast, expenditures in Miami
would experience a sharp decline, from $7,847 to $5,028. (Recall that
these figures are in price- and age-sex-raceadjusted 1996 dollars,so
the actual benchmark in Miami would be higher in nominal terms.)
The budgetary implications would be substantial. Accordingto the
Board of Trustees (1999), the Part A Medicare Trust Fund is predictedto
deplete its current balances by 2015 according to intermediateprojec-
tions. We considered how the trust fund would be affected by imple-
menting our proposed reform for Medicare Part A expenditures
beginning in 2000. In one case, the 10 percent aggregate reductionin
expenditures would be implemented immediately; in anothercase, it
would be phased in over a five-year period. Using the Board of
Trustees' assumptions about payroll taxes, interest rates, and other fac-
tors, we found that reducing the regional variation in Medicareexpen-
ditures had a substantial impact on the trust fund balances. Figure3.6
shows the intermediate trust fund predictions, with all valuesin con-
stant 1999 dollars. Under the status quo, it becomes bankrupt in 2015
and (if allowed to borrow) would end in 2024 witha negative balance
of $562 billion in 1999 dollars.23 By contrast,an immediate policy to
reduce regional variation in Medicare spending would lead toa posi-
tive $180 billion balance in the trust fund in 2024;even the gradual
phase-in results in a positive $132 balance in 2024.
The Part A trust fund may not be the best indicator of the long-term
viability of Medicare, a point that even the Board of Trustees make
(Board of Trustees, 1999). Another way to judge the value of reducing
regional variation is to consider what the money thus saved would
provide in different benefits. One proposal has been to fund drug
benefits for Medicare enrollees, particularly those with lowincomes.24
A 10 percent reduction in conventional Medicare spending (bothPart A
and Part B) could fund a drug benefit of approximately $20 billion,
enough to fund a general nonmeans-tested drug benefit. In short, the
potential savings realized by reducing geographical variations in
Medicare spending are sufficiently large either to extend the life of the
Medicare Part A trust fund another ten yearsor to provide drug
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Figure 3.6
Medicare Part A Trust Fund projections
VI.Discussion and Policy Implications
It is useful at this stage to review the results. We havedocumented the
wide variation in regional patterns of Medicare spending, and we have
shown that these variations are not the consequences of differences in
the age composition of the population or the idea that some areas are
sicker than others. This additional spending doesn't appear to have
measurable health benefits, nor is it likely to be explained by prefer-
ences. Finally, if the regional variation in Medicarespending does haye
little in the way of health benefits, attenuating regional disparities can
fund the Medicare trust fund for an extra ten years or provide new
pharmaceutical benefits for all enrollees. Thus, we argue that regional
variations in Medicare expenditures should be central to any Medicare
reform.
In theory, one might agree that there should be less variation across
regions, but how can variations be reduced in practice? Two primary
issues must be addressed. The first is, How might the Medicare system
be changed to reduce such variation? The second is, How do we know
that in the short-term, a relatively sudden change in the Medicare reim-
bursement system won't have an adverse impact on health?
One advantage of the premium support proposals suggested in the
bipartisan commission's final report is that such support programs
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make regional variations transparent. If the support amounts were ad-
justed to preexisting levels of regional per capita expenditures, then el-
derly citizens in Minneapolis would figure out quickly that their dollar
premium support was half the premium support in Miami. This trans-
parency in turn could lead to a greater level of political awareness of el-
derly people in low-expenditure areas who are wondering why their
Medicare premium support is so stingy, or why insurance companies
are averse to providing many options in comparison to their counter-
parts in high-expenditure areas.
The premium support approach would also provide a straightfor-
ward approach to the national benchmarking of health costs along the
lines suggested above. A gradual transition over a five-year period to a
national benchmark (with adjustments for price and illness differen-
tials) would be one way to implement such an approach. How insur-
ance companies would react to attenuated regional differences in
Medicare spending is not clear, however, because it would put them in
the unpleasant position of convincing providers to scale back their cus-
tomary high-intensity care patterns to lower intensity care.
One of the major concerns with the premium support approach has
been its reliance on insurance companies to provide a menu of different
options for the elderly. In the long-run, these options would likely in-
volve a heavier reliance on managed care policies. Yet broad evidence
suggests dissatisfaction, both from patients and from physician provid-
ers, with the managed care option (Simon et al. 1999). How might the
cost savings from reducing geographical variation be gained even un-
der the status quo, where fee-for-service accounts for the majority of
Medicare enrollees?
One option is to tie Medicare reimbursements to the regional level of
costs (after allowances for illness burdens and price level differentials).
For example, Diagnostic-Related Groups (DRG) payments might be
discounted by 20 percent, with the residual placed in an escrow ac-
count that is distributed at the end of the fiscal year depending on the
overall regional level of reimbursements. This system is similar to the
one now in place in Germany, where for some components of care,
physicians earn nonmonetary "credits," which are then converted into
payments at three-month intervals depending on the aggregate budget
and the number of credits submitted (Kamke 1998). The incentive
structure under fee for service does not directly address the problem
that a few physicians may be quite aggressive in their treatment pat-
terns because the relative advantage of prescribing more is still just as86 Skinner and Wennberg
high under this system. Would physicians migrate to regions with
higher per-unit reimbursement rates? Nevertheless, these regional
budget caps represent one approach to keeping Medicare afloat for at
least another decade.
The final question is how such short-term changes in the reimburse-
ment mechanisms would affect the quality of care. Would the response
of physicians to lower rates of reimbursements lead to more care being
administered? Or would physicians be less willing to treat Medicare
patients in high-use (and low-reimbursement-rate) areas, in much the
same way that Medicaid patients experience limited access to private
physician practices (Baker and Royalty 1999)? We do not know how
short-term reforms of this type might affect health care outcomes and
satisfactions. The potential benefits, in terms of both dollars saved and
diminished geographical inequality, are sufficiently large and perma-
nent to make answers to such questions worth investigating.
Notes
We relied heavily on the Dartmouth Atlas Working Groupand in particular the efforts
of Tom Bubolz, Kristy Bronner, Elliott Fisher, Jim Poage, Sandra Sharp, and Therese
Stukelin developing the Atlas database. We are also grateful to participants at the
NBER Conference on Frontiers of Health Economics for helpful comments, and to the
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the National Institute on Aging for financial
support.
These figures are for the fee-for-service population in the corresponding hospital re-
ferral region (HRR), which often includes a wider area than the boundary of the city. Be-
cause capitation payments for Medicare managed care are keyed to county-level
fee-for-servicepayments,theaverage Medicare payment acrossallenrollees
(fee-for-service plus managed care) is quite similar to these numbers.
However, the Commission did not approve the Breaux-Thomas proposal. See "Build-
ing a Better Medicare for Today and Tomorrow" (March 16, 1999), located at
http:/ /thomas.loc.gov/medicare/bbmtt3l599.html.
"Key IssuesinConsidering a Premium Support Program forMedicare,"
http:/ /thomas.loc.gov/medicare/pssd31299.html.
Practice variations associated with the intensity of general medical care should be dis-
tinguished from practice patterns associated with specific surgical procedures. For exam-
ple, the rate of carotid endartectomies in Miami is low relative to U.S. averages and is in
fact lower than the rate in Minneapolis (Wennberg and Cooper 1999).
See McClellan and Skinner (1999), Skinner and Fisher (1997), and Feenberg and Skin-
ner (1999).
Of course, considerable uncertainty is inherent in trust fund projections, so this
ten-year projected extension is illustrative more than definitive (Lee and Skinner 1999).Regional Inequality in Medicare Spending 87
For example, the New Haven, Connecticut, HRR is split in two by a coastal region of
Connecticut that migrates along Route 9 into Hartford. See Wennberg and Cooper (1999)
for details.
The price adjustment is a variant of the GPCI price index developed by Zuckerman,
Welch, and Pope (1990). The index depends on an index of office space costs and
(nonmedical) professional salaries in the region. See Wennberg and Cooper (1999) for de-
tails of the price index.
The per-capita measures of Medicare spending have been adjusted for differences
across regions in age, sex, and race by calculating age-sex-racespecific per-capita
Medicare spending in each HRR and then weighting each of these cells to make the HRR
consistent with the demographic composition in the U.S. elderly population.
For example, see Escarce, (1992, 1993), Stano and Folland (1988), Folland and Stano
(1989), Gruber and Owings (1996), and Green and Becker (1994).
These are available at the zip code level (from CensusCD, www.censuscd.com) but
were aggregated to the HRR level in this analysis.
The health and mortality data are from 1994/95; the mortality data are reported in
Wennberg and Cooper (1997).
For a recent discussion of Medicare risk adjustment, see Kuttner (1998) and lezonni
et al. (1998) and the references therein.
We also included the overall mortality rate as an explanatory variable. It entered with
a negative coefficient, however, suggesting that our indicators of health status capture
much of the extra costs of people in their last six months of life.
Including mortality rates in the regression does not improve predictive value, and
the coefficient on mortality is negative after controlling for the five indicators of health.
However, the univariate correlation between mortality and our illness-adjusted measure
of Medicare spending is positive.
The least-squares regression determines coefficients that essentially maximize the
percentage of the variation to be explained by the independent variables.
For example, they find a positive association between the percentage of the popula-
tion who are Hispanic and Medicare spending. As shown in figure 3.1, spending is par-
ticularly high in Texas and Florida, both states with large Hispanic populations. The
question is, Are these regional patterns being driven by higher demand on the part of the
Hispanic population or do Hispanics happen to live in areas with physicians who pro-
vide high levels of health care intensity?
Some elderly people die suddenly with little warning or health care expense. How-
ever, most people who die had chronic illness and frequent interactions with the health
care system prior to death.
All decile dummy variable coefficients were significantly different from decile 1 (the
bottom 10 percent).
A higher number of specialist visits in the last six months could be associated with
higher per-capita Medicare expenditures. However, the magnitude of differences in
spending on those in the last six months of life cannot come close to explaining the differ-
ences in overall per-capita Medicare spending because the last-six-months group make
up only about 5 percent of the Medicare population.88 Skinner and Wennberg
Either in terms of beds per thousand or hospital days per thousand residents.
Surprisingly, these indicators (and other indicators, such as annual eye examinations
for diabetics) are not closely correlated across regions (Wennberg and Cooper 1999).
The Board of Trustees' report does not provide predictions of the trust fundbeyond
2008. We used the intermediate-term predictions of growth rates in payroll taxesand ex-
penditures, as well as an assumed nominal interest rate of 6.6 percent, (1) to match our
generated trust fund estimate to the Board of Trustees' estimate through 2008, and (2) to
predict the status quo and counterfactual trust fund amounts to 2024. Some brief techni-
cal notes: The interest rate of 6.6 percent was slightly above the nominal rateof 6.4 per-
cent (a 3 percent real return and a 3.3 percent inflation rate implies ayield of 1.03X1.033
= 1.064) but doing so matched the Board of Trustees' reportbalances more closely. And
second, when growth rates were reported for, say, 2020, we assumed these growth rates
held for the five years 2020-2024.
For example, President Clinton has recently proposed the introduction of a new
"Part D" drug component of Medicare; see http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/
New/html/Medicare/DrugCoVerage/dOcUment/indehtmL See also Soumerai and
Ross-Degnan (1999).
References
Auster, R., and R. Oaxaca, 1981. "Identification of Supplier-Induced Demand inthe
Health Care Sector." Journal of Human Resources 16: 328-342.
Baker, L., and A. B. Royalty, 1999. "Medicaid Policy, Physician Behavior, andHealth Care
for the Low-Income Population," mimeo, Stanford University.
Board of Trustees, Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, 1999. 1999 Annual Reportof the
Board of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance Fund. Washington, DC: U.S. Government.
Chassin, M., 1993. "Explaining Geographic Variations: The Enthusiasm Hypothesis. Med-
ical Care 31: 37-44.
Chau, D., E. Fisher, and J. Skinner, 1999. "The Importance of Regional Practice Style in a
Cohort of Elderly Hip Fracture Patients," mimeo, Dartmouth Medical School.
Connors A. F., et al., 1996. "The Effectiveness of Right Heart Catheterization inthe Initial
Care of Critically Ill Patients." Journal of the American Medical Association 276(11) (Septem-
ber 18): 889-97.
Cutler, D., and L. Sheiner, 1999. "The Geography of Medicare." AmericanEconomic Review
89(2) (May): 228-233.
Escarce, J., 1992. "Explaining the Association Between Surgeon Supply and Utilization."
Inquiry 29: 403-415.
Escarce, J., 1993. "Would Eliminating Differences in Physician Practice Style Reduce Geo-
graphic Variations in Cataract Surgery Rates?" Medical Care 31: 1106-1118.
Feenberg, D., and J. Skinner, 1999. "Medicare Expenditures and Medicare Taxationby
State," mimeo, NBER.
Fisher, E., et al., 2000. "Associations Among Hospital Capacity, Utilization, and Mortality
of U.S. Medicare Beneficiaries-Controlling for Sociodemographic Factors."Health Ser-
vices Research 34(6) (February): 1351-1362.Regional Inequality in Medicare Spending 89
Folland, S., and M. Stano, 1989. "Sources of Small Area Variations in the Use of Medical
Care." Journal of Health Economics 8: 85-107.
Green, L., and M. Becker, 1994. "Physician Decision Making and Variation in Hospital
Admission Rates for Suspected Acute Cardiac Ischemia: A Tale of Two Towns." Medical
Care 32: 1086-1097.
Gruber, J., and M. Owings, 1996. "Physician Financial Incentives and CesareanSection
Delivery." RAND Journal of Economics 27: 99-123.
lezzoni, L. I., J. Z. Ayanian, D. W. Bates, and H. R. Burstin, 1998. "Paying More Fairlyfor
Medicare Capitated Care," New England Journal of Medicine 339(26): 1933-8.
Kamke, K., 1998. "The German Health Care System and Health Care Reform." Health Pol-
icy 43: 171-194.
Kuttner, R., 1998. "The Risk-Adjustment Debate," New England Journal of Medicine
339(26): 1952-6.
Labelle, R., G. Stoddart, and T. Rice, 1994. "A Re-Examination of the Meaning andImpor-
tance of Supplier-Induced Demand." Journal of Health Economics 13: 347-368.
Lee, R., and J. Skinner, 1999. "Will Aging Baby Boomers Bust the Federal Budget?" Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives 13(1): 117-140.
McClellan, M., B. J. McNeil, and J. Newhouse, 1994. "Does More Intensive Treatmentof
Acute Myocardial Infarction in the Elderly Reduce Mortality? Analysis Using Instrumen-
tal Variables." Journal of the American Medical Association 272 (September 21): 859-866.
McClellan, M., and J. Skinner, 1999. "Medicare Reform: Who Pays, and Who Benefits?"
Health Affairs 18(1): 48-62.
Pritchard, R. S., et al., 1998. "Influence of Patient Preferences and Local Health System
Characteristics on the Place of Death." Journal of the American Geriatric Society 46(10):
1242-1250.
Simon, S. R., et al., 1999. "Views of Managed Care: A Survey of Students, Residents,Fac-
ulty, and Deans at Medical Schools in the United States." The New England Journal of Medi-
cine 340(12): 928-936.
Skinner, J., and E. Fisher, 1997. "Regional Disparities in Medicare Expenditures: AnOp-
portunity for Reform." National Tax Journal 50(3): 413-425.
Soumerai, S. B., D. Ross-Degnan, 1999. "Inadequate Prescription-Drug Coverage for
Medicare Enrollees-A Call to Action." New England Journal of Medicine 340(9):722-8.
Stano, M., and S. Folland, 1988. "Variations in the Use of Physician Services by Medicare
Benificiaries." Health Care Financing Review 9: 51-57.
SUPPORT Principal Investigators, 1995. "A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seri-
ously Ill Hospitalized Patients. The Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for
Outcome and Risk of Treatment (SUPPORT)." Journal of the American Medical Association
274: 1591-1598.
Wennberg, J. E., and M. M. Cooper (eds.), 1997. The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care 1998.
Hanover NJ: Dartmouth Medical School.
Wennberg, J. E., and M. M. Cooper (eds.), 1999. The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care 1999.
Hanover NH: Dartmouth Medical School.90 Skinner and Wennberg
Wennberg, J., and A. Gittelsohn, 1982. "Variations in Medical Care Among Small Areas."
Scientific American 246: 120-134.
Wennberg, J. B., and J. Skinner, 1999. "The Efficiency of the Medicare Program," mimeo,
Dartmouth Medical School.
Zuckerman, S., W. P. Welch, and G. C. Pope, 1990. "A Geographic Index of Physician
Practice Costs." Journal of Health Economics 9(1): 39-69.